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The Binary Agora

albariberamartinez

The Binary Agora is an open space that serves as a meeting ground for legal tech discussions.

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  • 22 episodes
  • Avg 24 min
  • English

Episodes 22

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  • S2 · E33
    May 30 · 29 min

    #32 The Hidden Economics of Digital Platforms w/ Prof. Frédéric Marty

    This interview with Frédéric Marty explores the economics of digital platforms, competition law, and the impact of AI on market dynamics. It offers insights into the DMA and platform dependencies that shape the ordoliberal belief in the goals of competition. In the conversation, Fred touched upon a couple of rulings and pointed to a few of his recent research outputs. Click on those directly below: - 04:24, Sai Krishna Kamepalli, Raghuram G. Rajan, and Luigi Zingales' work on the kill zone: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3555915. - 10:20, The Court of Justice's recent Android Auto ruling (Case C-233/23): https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/document?source=document&docid=295687&doclang=en. - 11:02, The traditional requirements for refusal to supply in EU competition law, Bronner (Case 7-97): https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/affair?lang=en&sort=AFF_NUM-DESC&searchTerm=%22C-7%2F97%22&publishedId=C-7%2F97. - 14:11, Fred's paper alongside Patric Bougette and Oliver Budzinski on 'Ex-ante versus Ex-post in competition law enforcement: Blurred boundaries and economic rationale': https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2025.106264. - 17:25, The French competition authority's report on cloud: https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/en/press-release/cloud-computing-autorite-de-la-concurrence-issues-its-market-study-competition-cloud. - 18:00, Data egress fees are charges from cloud providers (like AWS, Google Cloud or Azure) for transferring data out of their network or to another region. - 18:40, Fred's work co-authored with Thierry Warin on 'Digital Platforms' Information Concentration: From Keystone Players to Gatekeepers': https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3753779. - 21:17, The "Chevalier de la Palice" (Jacques II de Chabannes) was a 16th-century French nobleman and military commander. Following his death, his grieving troops composed a song in his honor. However, a famous line on his tombstone; "If he weren't dead, he would still be envied" ("S'il n'était pas mort, il ferait encore envie"), was misread centuries later as: "If he weren't dead, he would still be alive" ("S'il n'était pas mort, il serait en vie"). This is where the French word lapalissade (and the English derivative "lapalissian") comes from. - 25:19, Teodora Groza's PhD thesis on 'Governing Innovation: Antitrust and the Organization of Industry': https://sciencespo.hal.science/tel-05379990. To learn more about Dr. Alba Ribera Martínez and her research, we invite you to visit her website: https://www.albariberamartinez.com. She also writes, from time to time, in her newsletter, the DMA Agora, about the latest developments surrounding the European regulation: https://www.linkedin.com/build-relation/newsletter-follow?entityUrn=7344021393451184128. The views and opinions expressed by our guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this podcast, its host, or any affiliated organisations.

  • S2 · E30
    May 26 · 25 min

    #31 A Tango Between Harms and Benefits: The EC's Draft Merger Guidelines w/ Prof. Nicolas Petit

    This interview with Nicolas Petit explores the European Commission's draft Merger Guidelines, focusing on dynamic competition, resilience, innovation, and the evolving analytical framework in merger review. Find the Draft Merger Guidelines here: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/46dde10f-85c1-4590-a3f4-2b71f85685ef_en?filename=Merger%20Guidelines%20-%20final%20for%20public%20consultation.pdf. In the episode, we referenced paragraphs of the Guidelines (find the transcriptions below) and some other developments. Click on the links below to access them directly: - 00:17, The Horizontal 2004 Merger Guidelines: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02). - 00:21, The Non-Horizontal 2008 Merger Guidelines: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008XC1018(03). - 05:42, Footnote 18 of the Draft Guidelines defining resilience: "the readiness and ability of the internal market or part of it to continue servicing customers and to anticipate, withstand and recover from serious shocks". - 08:35, Paragraph 25 of the Draft Guidelines: "If the merging parties consider that the merger gives rise to efficiencies, as part of their prospective analysis, they must articulate and substantiate, in due time, a ‘theory of benefit’. A theory of benefit sets out how specific merger efficiencies occur and maintain or enhance effective competition, to the benefit of consumers (...)". - 13:56, Paragraph 64 of the Draft Guidelines: "Market shares – especially those based on the previous year – may not fully reflect a firm’s market power (...)". - 14:06, Paragraph 80 of the Draft Guidelines: "In some industries or markets, a static assessment of market power does not fully capture a firm’s competitive strengths and weaknesses from a dynamic perspective. (...) In these cases, the Commission also considers various other factors to assess the influence on the competitive process that a firm may have (‘dynamic competitive potential’)". - 14:13, The moligopoly hypothesis: https://academic.oup.com/book/33503/chapter/287809787. - 14:28, Paragraph 101 of the Draft Guidelines: "In its competitive assessment, the Commission considers all competitive constraints faced by the merged firm irrespective of whether they arise from inside or outside the relevant market. Products that do not exert a sufficient competitive constraint on the merging firms’ products to belong to the same relevant market (out-of-market constraints) may still play an important role in the assessment of market power". - 16:59, Farrell and Shapiro's work on unilateral effects: https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/alternative.pdf. - 17:02, Ivaldi, Rey and Tilore on tacit collusion and non-coordinated effects (https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2003/tacit_collusion.pdf) and Steve Davies (https://publications.aston.ac.uk/id/eprint/18471/2/Tacit_collusion_firm_asymmetries_and_numbers.pdf). - 17:34, Paragraph 192 of the Draft Guidelines: "In cases where a transaction involves a small innovative company, including a startup, or an R&D project with a dynamic competitive potential, the Commission in principle does not find a SIEC in relation to any theory of harm, including the loss of innovation competition, potential competition, entrenchment and foreclosure (...)". - 22:16, The EC's Dow/DuPont case (https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/M.7932) and Illumina/Grail case (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/hu/ip_24_1964). - 23:45, Grail fails to develop cancer detection tests: https://www.statnews.com/2026/02/19/grail-cancer-test-galleri-results/. - 24:05, The Dynamic Competition Initiative: https://www.dynamiccompetition.com/. The views and opinions expressed by our guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this podcast, its host, or any affiliated organisations.

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