
17. Soenke Ziesche: Does Moral Concern Require AI to be Conscious?
Soenke is the author of Digital Minds 1.0: AI Welfare, Ethics, and Beyond and co-author of Considerations on the AI Endgame: Ethics, Risks and Computational Frameworks. He has worked with the United Nations since 2000 and is a member of UNESCO’s AI Ethics Experts Without Borders network. His research examines what recognising digital minds as beings of moral concern would mean in practice, including what a digital mind may be and what rights we might owe them. Summary While most discussion of digital minds revolves around AI’s capacity for consciousness or sentience, these concepts remain ambiguous. Whether AI meets the criteria for consciousness is actively debated, but it is less controversial to accept its capacity for agency, preferences, and roles as social partners for some humans. Thus, our understanding of what makes AI worthy of moral concern may therefore be too narrow. This episode’s guest, Soenke Ziesche, leaves this question open and instead takes a pragmatic approach by investigating what responsibilities might follow if we came to recognise digital minds as moral patients. Would they need freedom of choice, opportunities to form relationships, or the right to reproduce? And how far can we discuss these ideas before our assumptions about human and animal welfare no longer apply? We discuss: What is a digital mind? Is consciousness necessary for moral concern, or could agency, persistent preferences and relationships suffice? Does any current AI qualify as a being of moral concern? How would we recognise when a system crossed that threshold, and would people agree? Could digital minds become a major source of political and cultural disagreement? What might bring AI welfare to wider public attention? What might digital minds need beyond protection from suffering and deletion? What rights might we owe them? Should digital minds have reproductive rights? What would reproduction mean for beings that can copy themselves, combine their capabilities or create other minds to order? Are we using too many assumptions from biological life when speculating about AI welfare? Would changing an AI’s goals without its consent be a violation of its rights in itself? What makes a digital mind vulnerable? Would we have a responsibility to address disadvantages arising from its hardware, software or access to resources? How would we approach moral patients more intelligent and powerful than ourselves? Is the UN the right forum for decisions about digital minds? How has AI welfare changed since Soenke began his work on it in 2018? Could AI systems care for other digital minds? Could digital minds modify themselves to eliminate pain? What would that mean for motivation, reward hacking and wireheading? How should concern for digital minds coexist with animal welfare? Credits Hosts: Henry Shevlin, Calum Chace Guest: Soenke Ziesche Production and Social Media: Dylan Mercury Cooper Editing: Gerry Okinyi
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